On January 27, 2026, NARSOL, in collaboration with AZRSOL, filed a federal lawsuit in Arizona challenging the constitutionality of the Internet restrictions imposed by the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department on individuals convicted of sex offenses. Titled Kenneth Soule et al. v. Michael Cimino, in his official capacity as Chief Probation Officer of the Maricopa County Adult Probation

Department, Case No. 26-cv-00560, the case has four named Plaintiffs, all of whom are under the custody of Maricopa County Adult Probation Department and seek greater Internet access while on probation. Plaintiffs seek to have the case certified as a class action.

Plaintiffs claim that the current policy and practices of the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department unreasonably restrict Plaintiffs’ access to the Internet in violation the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that the Department’s policies violate the First Amendment because the restrictions imposed are “overly broad” in that they “impose categorical restrictions on Internet access for individuals on probation for sex offenses, regardless of offense conduct, supervision progress, or individualized risk assessment.” Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ¶ 71. Plaintiffs allege the Department’s policies violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the Department imposed its Internet restrictions “without individualized findings, written justifications, or any standardized review mechanism.” Id. at ¶ 81.

NARSOL-affiliated attorneys Mark Weinberg and Adele Nicholas have brought the case, along with local Arizona counsel Samantha K. DuMond of the Dumond Law Firm in Phoenix Arizona.

The post NARSOL files constitutional case in Arizona first appeared on NARSOL.

By Sandy . . . The Michigan Supreme Court, on July 29, 2024, issued an opinion that may result in close to 300 people being removed from Michigan’s sex offender registry. The case, People v. Lymon, revolved around whether individuals who had committed crimes that were non-sexual in nature could appropriately be required to register; the court held that they could not and that to do so was unconstitutional.

Unfortunately, the minority opinion, included in the decision, is garnering almost as much interest as the majority one. Emails directed to the NARSOL communications desk have been concerned with what it says and the message that it sends and perpetuates. That minority opinion is this: ” ‘The majority opinion ignores that countless Michigan families rely on the registry to ensure their safety. … Registration provides vital information for the parent who must choose a babysitter or entrust a child with a volunteer coach,’ said Zahra, who was joined by Justice David Viviano.”

August 6, 2024, NARSOL sent an email to 48 Michigan media outlets, all whose focus is Michigan news and politics. This is a copy of the email:

The post To MI media: Sex offender registry increases risk of harm to children first appeared on NARSOL.

Originally published in the CT Mirror; reprinted here in full with the author’s permission.

By James Cornelio . . . I was born in Torrington in 1955, the son, one of four, of a successful small-town automobile dealer and a stay-at-home mom. After graduating from Cornell University in 1977, I moved to Manhattan, attended Fordham Law School and, upon graduation from Fordham, practiced real estate and private banking law in Manhattan for over 20 years. Upon my release from a New York prison in 2007, I moved back to Connecticut and, as the law required, registered as a sex offender.

Understanding the power of those two words, I have tried elsewhere to explore, as best I could, why and how those words have come to forever define who I am. Here, however, I’m going to explore the effect of those words not just on me but on the legal system which, trained as I was, I had come to respect.

On April 22, 2018, I was arresed in my home because of a warrant issued at the request of the sex offender registry unit of the Connecticut State Police (SORU) for failing to file an email address with them which, as a registered offender, Connecticut law also required. Notably, it was an email address which, though I hadn’t ‘filed’ with SORU, I had used multiple times over several years in communicating with them prior to their request for a warrant. So why did they nonetheless seek my arrest?

In part, because they could.

Thankfully, they no longer can, at least not for that crime.

On Sept. 14, 2023, a Federal District Court held in Cornelio v. CT, a case I initially brought pro se, that the Connecticut law requiring that registrants file their email addresses and all other “internet identifiers” with the police or risk being charged with a class “D” felony violates the First Amendment. Consequently, the court permanently enjoined the state from enforcing the law. Less thankfully, because I had not fashioned my case as a “class action” lawsuit, the court, notwithstanding our request to do so, refused to extend that First Amendment protection to any registrant in the state other than to me.

But given that the court itself acknowledged that “the reasons that the law is invalid as to Cornelio would appear to apply with equal force to all other sex offenders,” we fully expect that a class action lawsuit, to be filed as soon as resources allow, will extend the protection provided to me by my case to all other registrants in the state.

That law, it should be said, is duplicated in states across the country. Moreover, it is but one of many other laws which, of all those who have committed a crime and served their time, apply only to those of us who have committed a sex crime. In fact, it was SORU’s earlier enforcement of one of those other laws, and my reaction to that enforcement, which, most certainly, was the reason why SORU sought my arrest for my subsequent ‘email crime.’

Briefly, in July, 2015, I was arrested because I failed to confirm my home address within the 10-day statutory time period set forth in a Connecticut law requiring registrants to provide written confirmation thereof every three months or face a felony charge. Once the state prosecutor was convinced I would not ‘cop a plea’ to any charge because of my late mail, the case was dismissed. I then, in what was surely a first for them, brought my first pro se case by suing SORU in Federal Court for violating my Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.

In my court papers, I pointed out that SORU, in seeking my arrest, had not only ignored both their own (reasonable) protocol on late confirmation letters and the relevant law’s direction that they refer late letters to local police but, more pointedly, they had ignored that the presumptive purpose of the law was to assure a registrant hadn’t moved. I hadn’t. And they had no reason because of a late letter or otherwise to believe that I had. And if, for some reason, they were concerned that I had moved, there were far simpler and more effective, and far less punishing, ways of determining that risk to the public than by seeking my arrest.

Well, I learned that, per the statutory language adopted by Connecticut lawmakers and interpreted by the state’s highest court, it doesn’t matter whether one has moved or not. Nor does it matter whether the police have a reasonable suspicion that a registrant has moved. Nor even whether the late return of a confirmation letter was unintentional or otherwise excusable. No, under that law as interpreted by that court, a registrant can be arrested and be held strictly liable for a Class D felony simply because their mail is late. Think about it. The elements of this felony are established by two postmarks.

Suffice it to say, with reasonableness rendered irrelevant, my Fourth Amendment case was dismissed. Not long thereafter, I was arrested for my email crime.

I write this not to bemoan my fate but to shine a light on the fact that laws which were meant to protect the public have, with little significant push-back, been weaponized by lawmakers, the courts and those tasked with enforcing those laws. Beyond my personal experience are these other examples: here, strict residency requirements wreak havoc and hardship: or here, even visiting registrants must beware; or here, Halloween horrors abound; and then there’s this; and this; and this; and this; and … more.

Given all that, let me suggest that the reasoning by the Supreme Court in its 2003 decision in Smith v. Doe was, at best, naïve if not willfully blind to what cruelty it might unleash. In that seminal case, the court ruled that an Alaska law establishing a public registry and requiring convicted sex offenders, who have already served their court-imposed sentences, to thereafter routinely re-register on that public registry was merely “regulatory” and not punitive in nature. In effect, the court’s decision meant that judges and juries — that is, those familiar with the particulars of the who, what, when and where of the crime — need not even be aware of, let alone weigh in on, whether the defendant before them may become subject to those “regulatory” reporting requirements. Instead, as I personally experienced by being required to register for life, a sweeping, harshly crude, paint-by-numbers formula for determining one’s “risk” to the public is unilaterally imposed by those who write the laws — and who answer only to the voters.

Not only voters but any empathetic human being understands, and would seek to allay, the pain and abiding distress of those who have been sexually victimized and the fear of others, especially parents, about their own potential victimization or that of their children. But an uniformed belief that so-called “stranger danger” is widely prevalent and that but for public registries the recidivism of convicted sex offenders would be out-of-control have served to further inflame sexual fears already ignited by a competitive media seeking clicks and ambitious politicians seeking power, both more-than-ready to exploit those fears.

The result is a legal system which has gone well beyond the deeply unfortunate, if somewhat less punitively oppressive, Alaska law at issue in the Doe case to one which now embodies the modern equivalent of banishment for a whole class of citizens.

The post Life and occasional victory as a “sex offender” registrant first appeared on NARSOL.

By Mark . . . On May 31, 2024, the parties filed their opening summary judgment briefs in Antrim v. Carr, 19-cv-396 (Eastern District of Wisconsin), in which plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s statutory scheme requiring that certain individuals convicted of sexual offenses be forced to wear a GPS monitoring device for life, even after they are off of any criminal supervision. Attached below are each side’s opening summary judgment briefs. Response briefs in the case are due July 5, 2024. NARSOL is intimately connected to the litigation, having subsidized the full costs of the plaintiffs’ two expert witnesses — Kate Weisburd, a law professor at George Washington University School of Law, and Kelly Socia, Professor in the School of Criminology and Justice Studies and a Fellow for the Center for Public Opinion at the University of Massachusetts, Lowell.

The post NARSOL cases in Illinois and Wisconsin moving forward first appeared on NARSOL.

On Friday, January 19, 2024, NARSOL filed a federal lawsuit in Illinois challenging the constitutionality of a parole restriction that prohibits individuals with convictions for sexual offenses from using erectile dysfunction medication. The two plaintiffs in the case are NARSOL on behalf of its Illinois members and Jason Ridley, an individual on mandatory supervised release in Illinois who seeks to use ED medications to counter the common side effects caused by prostate cancer surgery. Mr. Ridley is also a member of NARSOL. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are Mark Weinberg and Adele Nicholas. The case is The National Association for Rational Sex Offense Laws et al. v. Hughes, #24-cv-50025 (Northern District of Illinois). Plaintiffs seek to certify the case as a class
action.

Plaintiffs allege that the challenged statute (e.g., 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.10))
interferes with fundamental liberty interests—namely, intimate aspects of
sexuality and private medical decisions—and as such violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The significance of
the lawsuit goes beyond the substantive legal claims at issue.  This is so
because, under current law in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, individuals
cannot challenge statutory parole restrictions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but can
only challenge them via a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Habeas corpus petitions are often an inadequate remedy when a parole
condition violates constitutional rights because, before bringing a habeas
petition, the plaintiff must first exhaust state court remedies, which can take
years. Moreover, a plaintiff in a habeas case cannot bring a class action
lawsuit and cannot recover attorneys’ fees from the state. The federal courts
of appeals are split on the issue, and Plaintiffs seek to have the Seventh
Circuit come in line with the other circuits that allow such challenges under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

The post New NARSOL suit filed in Illinois first appeared on NARSOL.

By  Stephen . . . Federal civil suits have been filed in both Arizona and Missouri challenging the constitutionality of state-imposed registry laws.

In Arizona, John Doe, an activist within AZRSOL, a NARSOL Affiliate, filed a broad suit encompassing multiple parts of the registry and is seeking a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against the Sheriff of Maricopa County, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution.

The complaint filed on behalf of registrant Doe alleges that the violations apply both to Doe and facially to all of Arizona’s approximately 14,000 registrants. Doe has been required to register in Arizona since 2015 for a non-internet-based crime, and he is not listed publicly on the registry, as he was deemed a low risk, Level One, offender.

The suit claims the 2021 Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 13-3821 and 13-3822, violate the First Amendment by preventing Doe and others from exercising their right to free speech by preventing them from exercising lawful discourse on the internet free of government surveillance. Internet identifiers must be reported, even if the underlying offense did not involve the internet or a minor. Any website intended for use must be identified before it is used, even if it is an adults-only website.

Doe also has no means to be removed from the registry, and most Arizona registrants must remain on the registry for life without further assessment of risk.  A recent case from South Carolina ruled a similar registry law unconstitutional. (Powell v. Keel, 433 S.C. 457, 860 S.E.2d 344 (2021)). The suit alleges that lifetime registration “. . . predicated solely on the fact of conviction and without opportunity for judicial review, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”

The suit also alleges a plethora of vaguely worded laws that leave both registrants and law enforcement guessing when and how various requirements must be reported. The suit claims, “The Reporting Requirements of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 13-3821 and 13-3822 are Unconstitutionally Vague, Both on Their Face and As Applied, in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process.”

The suit claims the registry inflicts punishment, violating the Eighth Amendment. For example, “Under Arizona Statute § 13-3821(J), Plaintiff must, at all times, carry with him identification specifically identifying him as a sex offender.” Such branded identification cards were recently found unconstitutional in Alabama. (Doe v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (M.D. Ala. 2019))

In Missouri, a federal suit backed by ACSOL has been filed against the State Attorney General and the Chief of Police of Hazelwood, Missouri. The suit challenges the legality of mandated Halloween signage that must be placed in registrant’s addresses.

Thomas Sanderson was convicted of a sexual crime in 2006, prior to the passage of Halloween restrictions imposed by MO Rev Stat § 589.426  imposed August 28, 2008. Sanderson has from 2000 through 2022 displayed an elaborate Halloween decorative experience for his community, with up to 300 in attendance. The display included music and animated displays with lighting, fog machines, and bonfires. The local fire departments attended and handed out candy. Sanderson was aware of the new law and inquired multiple times with authorities, who all told him it was not applicable to him, as his crime predated the ordinance.

Suddenly on October 31, 2022, his residence with full display was surrounded with six marked police vehicles, sirens blaring. At least ten officers entered his property stating he was in violation of the state statute and requested to search his residence. Sanderson refused the request without a warrant. On November 3, a warrant was issued, and Sanderson was arrested and charged with one count of failure to comply with the statute. He was subsequently sentenced to 12 months of unsupervised probation.

The suit alleges that the statute mandating posted signage that states, “No candy or treats at this residence,” is compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. The suit cites NARSOL’s previously supported victory in Georgia over similar compelled signage at Halloween. McClendon v. Long, 22 F.4th 1330 (11th Cir. 2022).

Sanderson is seeking relief for himself and all the approximately 20,000 registrants in Missouri. The suit asks that the defendants be enjoined in perpetuity from enforcement of the mandated signage and that the signage law be struck as null and void in violation of the First Amendment.

Federal district cases such as these have potential for a broader impact. If the litigants are successful, the decision is often appealed to one of the twelve federal circuit courts. Arizona is in the Ninth Circuit while Missouri is in the Eighth Circuit. Successful appeals have the potential to become binding precedent to all states within that circuit and offer persuasive authority to other circuits.

NARSOL is hopeful for positive findings as both the Arizona and Missouri cases move forward.

The post Multiple federal lawsuits filed first appeared on NARSOL.