By Larry . . . NARSOL is excited to report on a win in the case of Montana v. Richard Hinman. We just learned of the case although it was decided on June 14, 2023. The question and issue before the court was:  Did retroactive application of the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act violate the prohibition against ex post facto punishment in Article II, Section 31, of the Montana Constitution?

The case arose from an appeal filed by Richard Hinman. Hinman appealed an order entered in a trial court in 2019. The district court denied Hinman’s motion to dismiss the charge against him for failure to register. Hinman was convicted of an offense in 1994 and discharged his sentence. At the time, Montana’s Sexual Offender Registration Act, now known as the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA) required Hinman to maintain registration for ten years and only to submit an annual verification through mail. As is so common in most states, the Montana Legislature amended the SVORA requirements to include more onerous steps and applied them retroactively to previously convicted registrants. When Hinman was charged with failure to register in 2019, he argued that the charges should be dismissed because the amended SVORA requirements had evolved and now rendered the statute an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment. After the district court denied Hinman’s motion, he pled guilty to the charge while reserving his right to appeal.

States appear to be unable to help themselves, continually piling on more requirements that transform what was originally a relatively benign regulatory system into something clearly punitive. In 2003, the Montana Supreme Court issued a decision finding that the intent and effect of SVORA was not to punish people convicted of sexual offenses. Rather, the Act served as a regulatory scheme collecting and disseminating information meant to reduce recidivism and help the public mitigate potential harms State v. Mount, 2003, 317 Mont. 481, 78 P.3d 829. The court gave a passing nod to the inclusion of reducing recidivism as part of the purpose of SVORA, writing “[A] growing body of research into the effectiveness of sex offender registries has cast significant doubt on their capacity to prevent recidivism” and citing a 2013 study Opinion at 14.

It should be noted that Hinman had pled guilty to a registry violation and paid a fine prior to this case. In 2019, Hinman again faced a charge of failure to register. By that time, the SVORA scheme had grown yet further. There had been amendments in 2007, 2013, 2015, and 2017.

Those amendments included many new obligations for Level 2 offenders such as Hinman. This is a far different registry than what was originally enacted back in 1994, as shown here.

• Originally the person was automatically removed after 10 years from initial registration. Now 25 years must pass without a re-offense or failure to register before they can petition for removal from the registry, and Level 3 offenders cannot petition for removal at all.
• Registrants must now supply law enforcement with DNA samples, email addresses, social media names, vehicle descriptions, license plate numbers, social security numbers, and workplace and school addresses.
• Law enforcement is empowered to supply most of that information to the public.
• Registrants must now update their address, work, and school information within three days of a change.
• All updates as well as periodic verifications and new photographs must now be conducted in-person with law enforcement.
• Transient registrants must now check in with law enforcement monthly.
• Any time registrants leave their county of residence for more than 10 days, they now must re-register in whatever county they travel to and re-register upon returning home.

Hinman challenged his 2019 charge “. . . on the grounds that our earlier reasoning about the nonpunitive nature of SVORA no longer holds true today” Opinion at 5. The court noted Hinman cited a growing body of caselaw in other jurisdictions regarding the constitutionality of applying similar laws retroactively, and he pointed to the breadth of collateral consequences for SVORA registrants that are apparent today but did not exist or were not well understood in 1989 or 2003. The State argued that the court should hold fast to State v. Mount (2003) and maintain its reasoning and outcome as applied to the present SVORA provisions and Hinman’s case. The court stated, “The basis for our analysis of whether the present SVORA is punitive does not arise in a vacuum but rather exists within a larger jurisprudential context. Mount, for example, found its footing in the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning about an Alaskan sex offender registration law. [That case is Smith v. Doe.] In Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Alaska’s law did not violate the ex post facto clause in the federal constitution because it was not punitive. Later the same year, Mount addressed Montana’s SVORA, which was then relatively similar to the Alaskan law. In that decision, we explicitly adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s analytical framework and the ‘intents-effects’ test” Opinion at 7-8. In Mount, the Montana Supreme Court reasoned that a scheme which merely increases the accessibility of already-public criminal records information and requires those with such records to periodically mail in address verification is not as onerous as criminal punishment and can fall on the civil regulation side of the line. The court stated, “Our analysis in Mount of whether SVORA imposed an affirmative restraint or disability on registrants noted that verification by mail is a minor and indirect restraint and does not affect someone’s physical movement” Opinion at 9.

The court continued, “It is one thing to have your already public criminal record made more accessible and to periodically update your address with the record-keepers. It is another to be placed under a probationary surveillance system in perpetuity which is designed to facilitate social ostracism. It defies common sense and sound judgment not to view the latter situation, the SVORA scheme since 2007, as punishment for a person’s sexual crime.  All the features of the Act that supported our decision in Mount have changed dramatically since the law’s amendments in 2007, 2013, 2015, and 2017” Opinion at 10-11. “We conclude that the SVORA structure in place since 2007 is punitive and therefore cannot apply retroactively under the ex post facto clause. Unlike the pre-2007 SVORA, the law today places onerous, life-long, affirmative restraints on registrants that significantly hinder their liberty and deprive them of privacy…”  Opinion at 15.

NARSOL is elated with this outcome, and we look forward to more legal victories using similar arguments.

Larry is an authority in legal issues, legislative affairs, and policy.

The post Awesome victory in Montana first appeared on NARSOL.

By Levi Ismail . . . It’s costing taxpayers hundreds of thousands of dollars as more people file lawsuits claiming they shouldn’t be restricted by a registry that didn’t exist when they were convicted.

Dozens of people have since been removed from the registry as a result, with dozens more potentially on the way.

Thomas spent more than 20 years on Tennessee’s Sex Offender Registry but now considers himself a free man. We’ve agreed to stick with first names for his protection.

The post Tennessee releasing ex-post facto registrants only through lawsuits first appeared on NARSOL.

By Bobby Harrison . . . A  three-judge panel of the United States 5^th Circuit Court of Appeals has struck down Mississippi’s lifetime ban on voting for people convicted of certain felonies, saying it is unconstitutional because it inflicts cruel and unusual punishment.

In a 2-1 ruling released Friday, the panel sent the case back to U.S. District Judge Daniel Jordan III in the Southern District of Mississippi with instructions to find the state’s lifetime ban on voting to be unconstitutional.

The majority said, “By severing former offenders from the body politic forever, Section 241 (the lifetime ban provision of the state Constitution) ensures that they will never be fully rehabilitated, continues to punish them beyond the terms their culpability requires and serves no protective function to society. It is thus a cruel and unusual punishment.”

Read the remainder of the article at Mississippi Today.

The post Lifetime voting ban for certain offenses declared unconstitution by Fifth Circuit first appeared on NARSOL.

By Larry . . . This win is fantastic, and the case is one of the most fascinating cases I’ve written about for NARSOL. Many critical legal issues are combined into one case, which is unusual. Our hope is that each reader will have a better understanding of: (1) binding precedential decisions; (2) cases that aren’t binding but are cited as persuasive authority; and (3) that textual interpretations aren’t always detrimental to our cause.

James Bullard Minter pled guilty in 1999 to misdemeanor sexual battery in Georgia and, according to sources, was not required to register. In 2019 Minter was living in Casper, Wyoming when a federal agency informed the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) that it had intercepted a firearm suppressor addressed to Minter. DCI performed a background check on Minter and discovered his Georgia conviction. DCI directed the Natrona County Sheriff’s Office to inform Minter that his conviction required him to register in Wyoming.

Minter registered as directed but filed a petition in district court seeking relief from the requirement. The district court granted the relief he had sought. DCI then intervened and moved for relief from the judgment. The district court vacated its judgment and granted DCI summary judgment. The court decided that Minter’s misdemeanor conviction in Georgia was the equivalent of felony second-degree sexual abuse of a minor in Wyoming.

An amazing fact is, “. . . the State of Wyoming, through the Natrona County District Attorney’s Office, joined Mr. Minter’s petition in his favor. It asserted that ‘[b]ased on the information the State has it is incredibly difficult to know what the facts or circumstances of Petitioner’s conviction were.’ It contended it therefore had to rely on an elements comparison to determine the equivalent Wyoming offense, which it agreed was sexual battery.” Opinion at 3. It also asserted, “. . . a review of Petitioner’s criminal history indicates that he has had no criminal activity or convictions since serving his sentence in Georgia. For twenty years he has remained a law-abiding citizen. To require him to register 20 years later with no further criminal involvement seems unjust.” Ibid.

The issues before the Wyoming Supreme Court were: (1) may DCI rely on dismissed charges to determine the facts or circumstances out of which an alleged sex offender’s conviction arose? and (2) may DCI require someone to register before it determines he or she has been convicted of a registerable offense? DCI’s position that it knew Mr. Minter to be an offender when it required him to register is based on its assumption that it may rely on a dismissed charge to determine the facts and circumstances of a conviction. The court found that assumption is flawed. The court stated, “When interpreting statutes, we seek the legislature’s intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” Id at 7. Most importantly, the court stated, “The ‘omission of words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by the legislature, and this court will not read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them.’ “ Ibid.

The Act requires an “offender” to register, and it defines that term succinctly. “ ‘Offender’ means a person convicted of a criminal offense as specified in W.S. 7-19-302(g) through (j), 6-2- 702, 6-2-703, 6-2-705 or 6-2-706,” or an offense “. . . in any other jurisdiction containing the same or similar elements.”  Ibid.

The court stated, “It follows that the conduct that DCI may consider in determining a registerable offense must be conduct for which the offender was convicted.”  Id at 8.

The court pointed out, “. . . states that allow consideration of conduct underlying an offense to determine equivalence have concluded likewise.” Ibid. They cited Doe v. Frisz, 643 S.W.3d 358, 362-63 (Mo. 2022). “The Frisz court there rejected reliance on abandoned pleadings where offender is defined as one convicted of offense. They cited the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hall, 294 P.3d 1235, 1236 (N.M. 2012). The Hall court held that to determine equivalence, courts must look beyond the elements of the conviction to the defendant’s actual conduct.” Ibid.

The state of Wyoming attempted to claim that federal law mandates a different outcome. The court stated, “The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) does not compel a different result. Contrary to DCI’s assertion, the Wyoming Act is not required to comply with SORNA. As the Tenth Circuit has observed, SORNA does not compel a state to do anything. Instead, it conditions a state’s receipt of certain federal funds on substantial implementation of SORNA’s registration requirements.” Id at 11. This has been this writer’s position for many years, and we are delighted to see that the Wyoming Supreme Court agrees with us.

In conclusion, the court stated, “The Act defines an offender as one convicted of a registerable offense. Because the requirement to register as a sex offender is premised on a conviction, DCI may not rely on dismissed charges to determine an individual’s registration requirements. Additionally, DCI may not require someone to register before it knows he or she was convicted of a registerable offense.“ Id at 17. NARSOL is delighted with this outcome.

The post Wyoming Supreme Court Victory first appeared on NARSOL.

By Sofia Saric . . . The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that the state’s Division of Criminal Investigation wrongly required a Casper man to register and remain on a sex offender registry for over three years.

The post WY made him register; their supreme court said “No can do!” first appeared on NARSOL.

In 2015, the ACLU of Rhode Island, on the heels of an announcement that the residency restriction distance for certain registrants would be increased from 300 to 1.000 feet, filed a suit to block the move and asked for a temporary restraining order, which was granted and has remained in place until now. NARSOL contributed to the case financially and issued this press release.

That was seven and a half years ago. The wheels of justice do indeed grind slowly, and sometimes they don’t grind at all, but this time they did. The new statute was found by the court to be unconstitutional due to being void for vagueness.

This is the ACLU press release:

Federal judge rules unconstitutional state’s residency restriction for sex offenders

March 16, 2023 – 3p.m. A federal court today ruled unconstitutional a state law that makes it a crime for certain sex offenders to reside within 1,000 feet of a school, finding that the statute would require individuals subject to it to guess whether they were in compliance with it, and potentially face a criminal trial if they guessed wrong.

In a 25-page opinion, Chief U.S. District Court Judge John McConnell, Jr. held that since “neither an ordinary person nor law enforcement could understand the statutory language that attempts to define the boundaries of residences and schools,” the residency prohibition is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. ACLU of RI cooperating attorneys challenged the statute when it was first enacted in 2015, and it has been subject to a preliminary injunction barring its enforcement since then.

The law provides for measuring the 1,000 foot distance “from the nearest boundary line of the real property supporting the residence of the person to the nearest boundary line of the real property that supports or upon which there exists a school.” ACLU of RI cooperating attorneys Lynette Labinger and John MacDonald noted the complete lack of clarity as to what property “supporting” a school was applicable in measuring the distance — what about spaces like playing fields, playgrounds, or parking lots? In fact, the court noted, the state has given differing interpretations of what that language means over the years, and most recently argued that it applies to any real property — even if not contiguous to the school — if it is “typically used by students for school purposes,” and that those determinations needed to be made on a case-by-case basis. In pointing out the problem with this approach, the court noted:

“After all, if the State’s process involved law enforcement, school officials, and attorneys collaborating to make precise individualized determinations on these boundaries, how could an ordinary person ever be expected to faithfully follow this process, let alone come to the same conclusion about where these boundaries lie? Not to mention that these difficulties facilitate arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement.”

Both nationally and locally, correctional administrators‚ experts involved in the treatment of sex offenders, victims’ rights groups, and advocates for the homeless have opposed sex offender residency laws as being ineffective, counter-productive, and potentially more, rather than less, harmful to public safety. The law applies to all Level 3 sex offenders, even if their crime was committed against an adult, and even though the overwhelming majority of sex offenses are committed against people the offender knows, not strangers.

Read the remainder of the RI ACLU’s press release here.

The post Finally! A decision in the Rhode Island residency restrictions case first appeared on NARSOL.

By Dave Byrnes . . .

CHICAGO (CN) — The Seventh Circuit heard arguments over Indiana’s controversial Sex Offender Registration Act on Friday morning, and not for the first time.

Indiana enacted the law known as SORA in 1994, requiring that those convicted of sex offenses in other states must also register as sex offenders in Indiana if they live or work there. It also contains a provision stating that convicted sex offenders moving to Indiana from another state must register even if their offense took place before the enactment of the law.

This contrasts with the law’s treatment of those who committed pre-SORA sex offenses while living in Indiana, and those who continue to live there after their offense. Those in-state residents are not required to register if they weren’t required to do so prior to SORA’s enactment or its subsequent revisions.

This divergent treatment between in-state and out-of-state offenders prompted a constitutional challenge to the law in October 2016, brought by six men placed on the SORA registry despite being convicted of sex offenses prior to SORA taking effect. The men claimed that SORA inhibited their constitutional right to travel across state lines, and violated the state’s ex post facto clause and the federal equal protection clause – that is, punished them under a law that did not exist when they made their offenses, and more severely than longtime Indiana residents.

In a July 2019 ruling, U.S. District Judge Richard Young agreed. The Bill Clinton appointee barred the state from applying SORA penalties to the six men, which in turn prompted the Indiana Department of Corrections to appeal his decision to the Chicago-based Seventh Circuit.

Read full article

The post 7th Circuit considers overturning ruling on Indiana SORA first appeared on NARSOL.

By Larry . . . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has breathed new life into the case of Does v. Richard L. Swearingen. While this is indeed good news, NARSOL cautions that we not become too giddy. The court noted that “. . . the constitutionality of the registry law is not before us— we must determine whether the plaintiffs’ claims are timely.” This means that the underlying claims must be fully adjudicated by the District Court upon remand from the Eleventh Circuit.

The plaintiffs, whose offenses predate the existence of registration in Florida, have been subject to this reporting structure since the registry law was enacted in 1997. The state moved to dismiss the complaint, contending in part that the underlying basis for the claims accrued long ago. For each claim, the state traced the alleged injury to an amendment to the registry law and measured the limitations period from that amendment’s effective date. The plaintiffs responded that they were not challenging their designation as sex offenders but the constitutionality of second-generation registration burdens and the continuing threat of imprisonment for failing to meet them. The district court dismissed the claims, agreeing with Florida that the plaintiffs’ injuries stem from one-time acts, the enactment of each provision that allegedly injures them. Therefore, under the applicable statute of limitations, they [plaintiffs] were required to sue within four years of the date that each provision that imposed the challenged burdens was enacted. This decision from the Eleventh Circuit is the result of an appeal.

The plaintiffs alleged the following facts which the court must accept as true. The plaintiffs committed qualifying offenses prior to 1997, meaning they were registered for more than twenty years prior to the 2018 amendments. John Does 1 and 7 each report in person about eight times per year to re-register and report information changes, such as those caused by travel. Neither has been arrested for violating the registry law, but they fear that the law has become so onerous that an inadvertent failure to register is unavoidable. John Doe 6 suffers from a mental disability that requires him to depend on his sister to comply with his registration requirements, including his obligation to report in person four times a year. Before his sister began helping him, John Doe 6 was arrested twice for failing to comply with requirements that he did not understand. Like the other plaintiffs, he fears that the registry law now virtually ensures his future incarceration.

The Appeals Court noted that over the past twenty-five years, the Florida legislature amended the registry law more than a dozen times. The information collected now ranges from basic identifying information like a registrant’s permanent address to details like the license tag number of his roommate’s car. Any change to this information triggers a registrant’s duty to report, and failure to comply is a third-degree felony. The plaintiffs alleged that the reporting requirement became intolerable in 2018, when Florida again amended the registry law. Registrants are now required to report any absence from their permanent residence, for any reason, that lasts more than three days.

The case was salvaged by the Continuing Violations Doctrine. According to the Court, “The continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur within the statutory period.” If a defendant’s actions violate a plaintiff’s rights on a repeated or ongoing basis, then a cause of action may be timely even if the first violation took place outside the statute of limitations, citing Calloway v. Partners Nat’l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 448–49 (11th Cir. 1993). The Court stated, “We believe the plaintiffs have alleged a continuing violation. The registry law requires the plaintiffs to make multiple in-person reports each year, even if nothing about their registration information changes. In addition to that requirement, each day the plaintiffs must try to determine whether an action they take—whether, for example, they wish to purchase a new car, book a weekend trip, or create a new online account—requires making an in-person report. The complaint contends that these reports are time-consuming and burdensome, and the plaintiffs allege that they have forgone certain opportunities because of the likelihood that they would have to report information to the Commissioner.”

The plaintiffs also argued that they have been injured by their very classification as sex offenders. They contend that they are being unconstitutionally punished under the Eighth Amendment because the law imposes obligations on them “until they die” without any individualized assessment of their risk of re-offense. The court stated, “We believe the counts about this alleged injury are based on nothing more than the lingering effects of the plaintiffs’ initial designation as sex offenders, which occurred over twenty years prior to this lawsuit. The plaintiffs were either provided with appropriate process before they were ‘punished’ by being placed on the list, or they were not.” This means that this specific claim is dead.

The case, however, is very much alive, and NARSOL is grateful for the work done by our affiliate, the Florida Action Committee. We look forward to reporting more on this case as it develops in the District Court.

The post Sweet Victory in Florida: Eleventh Circuit gives go-ahead to F.A.C. case first appeared on NARSOL.

Pennsylvania Assc. for Rational Sexual Offense Laws . . . Here in Pennsylvania (PA), we have been given hope for significant improvement, possibly even abolishment, of SORNA. Judge Allison Bell Royer of Chester County has written an eloquent opinion on the June 2021 evidentiary hearing involving this case.

This analysis summarizes all the key points; however, due to the importance, we highlight how the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Alleyne and Apprendi were effectively used in this case in Pennsylvania.

Please note that PARSOL does not give legal advice. For those who live in Chester County, we recommend that you follow up with your attorney and ask how this decision affects the status of your registration.

The key points of the court’s opinion have been discussed by ACSOL and on episode 236 of the Registry Matters podcast, where PARSOL’s executive director was a guest.

The three key points are as follows:

First, the main argument in this case is that SORNA violates Pennsylvania’s Constitution, Article I, Section 1, Right to Reputation, which states, “All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness” (emphasis added). The PA General Assembly made a legislative finding that “Sexual offenders pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses, and protection of the public from this type of offender is a paramount governmental interest.” The defense argued that the legislative finding is not universally true. As a result, the court found, “. . . irrebuttable presumption unduly stigmatizes persons convicted of committing sexual offenses, a class of crimes that covers a wide spectrum of conduct, and does so without any consideration of individual characteristics and circumstances” Opinion at 3. Studies have consistently shown that persons on the registry have a low rate of reoffending.

We stress the term “indefeasible” because, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, it means “(of a claim or right) not vulnerable to being defeated, revoked, or lost.” Indefeasible is distinct from “inalienable” which means “not transferable or assignable.” An inalienable right can be forfeited through due process, but an indefeasible right, according to its definition, cannot under any circumstance be taken away by the government. As an afterthought, the right to an expungement is the enforcement of the constitutional right to reputation in the context of a criminal case after the sentence is completed.

At the heart of the legal and advocacy matter is the stigma of “high risk,” which ruins the chances for registrants to “. . . successfully rehabilitate under Pennsylvania law, rehabilitation being another indisputable aim of penal legislation and an equally compelling interest and policy of the Commonwealth” Fross. v. County of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1993 (Pa. 2011), aff’d, 438 Fed. Appx. 99 (3^rd Cir. Pa. 2011).

Dr. Elizabeth Letourneau, Ph.D. explained many studies have demonstrated that the registration and notification elements of SORNA do not considerably decrease recidivism rates. In some states, non-sexual recidivism rates have increased because the stigma has encumbered a registrant’s efforts to a successful reentry. Loss of housing, job, friends, family, and social supports are needed for a successful reintegration into society. Any state that seeks successful reentry or promotes public safety must reevaluate their versions of SORNA and other restrictive laws, because the end results of these statutes contradict said goals.

Second, after Judge Bell Royer’s examination of five of the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, she concluded that SORNA constitutes criminal punishment. All five factors were found to weigh in favor of the punitiveness of the statute. The five factors reviewed were (1) whether the statute imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether the resulting sanction or burden has historically been regarded as punishment; (3)) whether the statute promotes retribution and deterrence, traditional aims of punishment; (4) whether the statute is rationally connected to an alternative purpose other than punishment; and (5) whether the statutory sanction or burden appears excessive in relation to the alternative. More importantly, after the judge’s review of (2), sanction as punishment, she stated in a footnote “. . . that the provisions of SORNA are located in the [PA] Crimes Code and there are serious criminal penalties associated with one’s failure to comply. These facts support the conclusion that the second factor weighs in favor of a determination that SORNA is punitive” Opinion at 20, FN 8.

Third, because SORNA is punitive, “. . . it violates the cases of Apprendi and Alleyne; resulting in a criminal sentence that exceeds the statutory maximums; offends Federal and State proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment; and breaches the separation of powers doctrine” Opinion at 29, Court Order. Apprendi noted that a state’s provisions are over and above what the regular sentence would be for a particular crime. Alleyne asserted that the minimum amount of punishment must be made known to the defendant, and the finder-of-fact must determine whether these circumstances apply to the defendant.

Our Conclusion

Apprendi and Alleyne tie in numerous factors of constitutional rights afforded to every Pennsylvania citizen. Of particular importance is the breach of the separation of powers doctrine. Apprendi and Alleyne are judicial sentencing issues. According to the rulings in these two cases, sentencing issues should be left to the sole discretion of the court because no two cases are the same. As the court noted, “[F]acts can be murky and most often there are no independent eyewitnesses” Opinion at 14.

Equally important in Judge Bell Royer’s opinion is the Court Order (Opinion at 29). The judge said, “SORNA is unconstitutional both facially and as applied” to Mr. Torsilieri for all the above reasons. “Facially” is important to note because “facially unconstitutional” means that there is no set of circumstances by which it could be constitutional.

The PA Supreme Court had remanded this case back to the Chester County Court of Common Pleas for a full development of the record. As such, it will most likely be sent back up to the Supreme Court for their final decision. We do not know when a decision will be made, but we will remain ever vigilant for a result in our favor.

We hope this case or at least the arguable points behind it are transferable among the states. We are highly grateful to Mr. Torsilieri’s defense team and the experts who testified for their dedication and commitment both to rational sexual offense laws and seeing that the rights and dignity of registrants in Pennsylvania are protected.

The post PARSOL’s Analysis of Commonwealth v. Torsilieri first appeared on NARSOL.

NEW FREEDOM, Pa. – Today [8/23/22] Chester County Court Judge Allison Bell Royer ruled that Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act is unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. George Torsilieri.

“PARSOL and our affiliates across the country have long advocated against sex offender registries due to their punitive nature and ineffectiveness. Research indicates that most sexual offenses are committed by first-time offenders,” said PARSOL Executive Director Theresa Robertson, Ph.D., “We also believe the indefeasible right to reputation, as guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution, should prohibit registries that are too often used to harass citizens.”

In the 28-page opinion, Judge Bell Royer agreed, writing: “The bottom line, as the defense experts have demonstrated, is that 80% to 95% of all sex offenders will not re-offend.” and “(SORNA) encroaches upon a person’s fundamental right to reputation under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.”

On June 16, 2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded the case of Commonwealth v. George Torsilieri to the Court of Common Pleas in Chester County.

“At the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (SCOPA) level, the Commonwealth was unable to substantiate SORNA’s presumption that ‘all sex offenders pose a high risk of sexually reoffending’ and therefore able to be imposed as part of criminal sentencing, so it sent the case back to the lower court for this ruling,” according to Robertson. “We are thrilled by Judge Royer’s decision and grateful to Mr. Torsilieri’s legal team for its diligence and the robust research presented by the expert witnesses.”

Judge Royer’s ruling also states that “[SORNA] does not function as intended and is not effective at promoting public safety. It diverts resources away from offenders who could most benefit from them. Finally, SORNA catches in its net offenders who have committed crimes with no sexual component to them. It is unconstitutionally overbroad and excessive.  We find that SORNA’s registration and notification provisions are punitive in effect, overriding the Legislature’s attempted creation of a civil regulatory scheme.”

In addition, the ruling states that SORNA “results in a criminal sentence in excess of the statutory maximums; violates Federal and State proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment; and breaches the separation of powers doctrine.”

“We see this as a big step toward ensuring the rights and dignity of all Pennsylvanians by shifting resources toward the promotion of legislative, policy, and practical applications that will, through evidence-based measures, actually protect citizens from sexual harm,” added Robertson.  “While the long-term effects of today’s decision are uncertain, and may result in further action by SCOPA, it nonetheless is a significant finding that coincides with PARSOL’s mission.”

With a population of 521,980 (2020), Chester County, Pennsylvania, has the seventh largest population of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties. Bordering Philadelphia, it is best known for housing the American Revolutionary War encampment Valley Forge where George Washington’s army housed and trained in 1777-78. There are currently 191 Chester County residents on the Megan’s Law List.

• A copy of Judge Royer’s ruling can be found here: Commonwealth v. Torsilieri – Aug 2022 Ruling

The post NEWS RELEASE: Judge declares PA Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act Unconstitutional first appeared on NARSOL.