By Savannah . . . Question: During a polygraph, can I still avoid self-incrimination by saying, “I request that my attorney respond to that particular question”?

Answer: The instinct is correct, but those words ask for the wrong protection. Two different rights are involved. The Sixth Amendment right to have a lawyer present applies to police questioning while you are in custody. A polygraph taken as a condition of probation or supervised release is usually not custody, so that protection usually does not apply. No lawyer can answer for you, and asking for one will not stop the questions.

What you want is the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and it does not work on its own. The Supreme Court has held that a person on probation who answers without claiming the privilege cannot argue later that his answers were forced. If you say something unclear, including asking for your lawyer, a court may decide you never claimed the right at all. To claim it, say so plainly: “I invoke my Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and decline to answer that question.”

Before you use those words, though, be sure the question calls for them. The privilege covers only questions where a truthful answer could expose you to a new criminal charge, usually for an offense you were never charged with. It does not cover the offense you were already convicted of or questions that could only get you in trouble with your probation officer, such as missing curfew. Claiming it on a question it does not cover gains you nothing and marks you as uncooperative.

Remember, too, that invoking the privilege does not happen in isolation. Your refusal will be recorded and reported to your probation officer, who will want to know what it concerned. Refusing one question out of thirty tells everyone which subject you did not want to discuss; you may protect the answer and still give away the topic. Expect closer attention afterward: more testing, stricter conditions, a setback in your treatment program. Courts have held that your supervision cannot be revoked for the invocation itself, but that protection is narrower than it sounds. It does nothing for a revocation that grows out of the closer scrutiny your refusal invites, and in practice that is the more likely path.

Your state’s law also matters here. Some states protect these disclosures. In West Virginia, for example, what you say during a full disclosure or sexual history polygraph cannot be shared with law enforcement without your consent or used in the state’s courts, unless it concerns a plan to commit a future crime. W. Va. Code § 62-11D-2(e)(2). Many states have no such protection. If your answers already cannot be used to prosecute you, the Fifth Amendment may add nothing, and refusing may be treated as plain noncompliance. If there is no protection and a truthful answer could expose you to a new charge, that is when the privilege matters most.

In short, asking for your attorney is not claiming the Fifth Amendment. If you want the privilege, claim it in plain words. But whether you should claim it depends on your state’s law, your treatment program, and facts about your case that no article can know. Do not work it out in the polygraph room. Write to the public defender’s office in the county where you were sentenced, or to a criminal defense attorney licensed in your state, before your examination.

The post Legal Corner: Can I Ask for My Attorney During a Polygraph? first appeared on NARSOL.

By Larry . . . The Minnesota Supreme Court recently issued a decision in Siegel v. Evans. Chad Loran Siegel was charged with two counts of kidnapping, a predatory offense under the predatory-offender-registration statute, as well as attempted second-degree murder and first-degree assault related to an incident where Siegel and accomplices beat victim J.A.L. The case went to trial. The trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charges. The jury found Siegel not guilty of attempted second-degree murder but guilty of assault.

Minnesota’s predatory-offender-registration statute, Minnesota Statutes section 243.166, subdivision 1b(a)(1), provides that a person who has been “charged with” one of the statute’s enumerated predatory offenses and “convicted of” that offense or another offense “arising out of the same set of circumstances” must register as a predatory offender. Minnesota is or is close to being unique in imposing predatory-offender registration on every person who has been charged with, but not convicted of, a statutorily enumerated predatory offense and who has been convicted of a non-predatory offense arising out of the same circumstances as the charged predatory offense.

In August 2022, Siegel sued Drew Evans in his official capacity as the superintendent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA). Siegel argued that requiring him to register as a predatory offender based on the dismissed kidnapping charge was a violation of his procedural and substantive due process rights and that it violated the predatory-offender-registration statute. Siegel also argued that the predatory-offender-registration statute is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Siegel brought suit under the United States and Minnesota constitutions.

The question on which the court granted review is whether Siegel was required to register as a predatory offender under section 243.166. Siegel argued that section 243.166, subdivision 1b(a)(1), does not require a person to register under circumstances where the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal on the charged predatory offense. He contended that after the trial court entered the judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charges, he was no longer charged with a predatory offense for purposes of section 243.166.

The BCA disagreed. The BCA argued that a person is charged with a predatory offense during the period it labels the time of charging, a period which includes pretrial proceedings, but which ends when trial begins. According to the BCA, a person who is initially charged with a predatory offense but later prevails on a pretrial motion to dismiss the charge for lack of probable cause is not subject to registration. But because a judgment of acquittal occurs after the trial starts and the “time of charging” ends, the BCA requires that a person who is acquitted of a predatory offense by judgment of the trial court register if the person is convicted of another crime arising out of the same set of circumstances.

The court did not find that argument persuasive. NARSOL agrees with this. The court stated, “Even if we accept the BCA’s interpretation that the statute requires Siegel to register, we hold that requiring Siegel to register after the trial court entered a judgment of acquittal at trial on the predicate predatory offense violates the Minnesota Constitution’s substantive due process protections.” Opinion, 8. Also, they stated, “Nothing suggests that the Legislature considered—or had any facts before it to support—whether expanding the statute’s requirement to register to persons acquitted of a predicate predatory offense at trial by entry of a judgment of acquittal would address the concerns underlying the law that we have identified. The BCA provided us with no such evidence.” Opinion, 18.

Although this decision is an “as applied” win for Siegel, it bodes well going forward for others who have charges dismissed at trial.

The post Dismissed Charges Do Not Trigger Predatory Offender Registration first appeared on NARSOL.

By Sandy , , , In 2000, in a case named Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court of the United States described the interest of parents in caring for their children to be, “. . .  perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”

And indeed, for the vast majority of Americans, the right to live with and parent our own

children is taken for granted. However, that right is subjugated for those found to have harmed their children, and for a smaller sub-set in one state, it is denied completely for those who have done nothing at all to harm their own children.

While several states have codified prohibitions and restrictions on persons with sexual offense convictions in regard to their own children, they appear to be tied to stringent requirements—narrowly tailored–and/or have built-in pathways to ending the prohibition. Apparently Alabama’s alone goes furthest. In Alabama, one conviction for any sexual offense involving a child, including people whose offense involved no contact with a child, renders many parents being barred for life from living with their own children as long as they are minors.

A man named Bruce Henry challenged that law as being unconstitutional.

In 2013, Mr. Henry had pled guilty to possession of child sexual abuse material. He served five years, relapsed in 2019 by viewing pornography while on probation, and his supervised probation was increased. He was clearly in the demographic that would place him under Ala. Code § 15-20A-11(d).

In August 2021 a child was born to Henry and his wife. Before the year was out, he had brought a 14^th amendment constitutional challenge against the sheriff and the county attorney of his county and the attorney general of the state of Alabama.

The case, Henry v. Abernathy, would go through three courts with each one finding essentially the same thing: The law was found to be unconstitutional because it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. While lower courts found this to be the case on its face, the final decision is that it is unconstitutional as  applied to Mr. Henry.

But the prohibition is breached. Precedent is set.

Upon the last decision September 29, 2026, a journalist with the Alabama Courthouse News Service reached out to NARSOL—(National Assc. for Rational Sexual Offense Laws)–for a comment, which he published unedited: “Any law or practice that keeps parents from parenting their own children when no crime has been committed against those children is not only unconstitutional but also cruel. It causes harm not only to the children and parents involved but to society as a whole as it undermines the basic structure of society–the family.”

NARSOL first wrote about the case in May of 2025.

NARSOL is thankful for courts that are willing to speak out concerning laws and practices that are unconstitutional and sincerely hopes that this decision is but the beginning in Alabama and indeed the Eleventh Circuit.

We are grateful for journalists and media outlets that still report the news objectively, showing both sides of an issue without bias or editorializing.

We are especially thankful for Mr. Henry and his persistence and determination to gain that most basic of rights, the right to fully parent his own child.

According to U.S. Laws, “The case could have far-reaching effects on similar laws in other states. Legal experts will be watching closely to see how this decision influences future cases involving sex offenders and parental rights.”

They will be watching—and so will NARSOL.

The post “The oldest fundamental interest” first appeared on NARSOL.

By Savannah . . . In May 2026, the Michigan Supreme Court issued an important decision in People v. Shaver, holding that its landmark 2021 decision in People v. Betts applies retroactively.

People who were convicted years ago for violating Michigan’s

unconstitutional registration law may now have an opportunity to have those convictions set aside.

The case arose from the experience of Gary Shaver, whose underlying offense occurred in 2004. At that time, Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) required registrants to report address changes within ten days. But over the years, the legislature dramatically expanded the law. By 2011, registrants faced far more burdensome requirements, including shorter reporting deadlines, in-person reporting, internet identifier disclosure, a tier classification system, and numerous additional restrictions.

In 2015, Shaver updated his address before moving into a new home. When the move unexpectedly fell through, his registered address remained incorrect for nineteen days. Although he had tried to comply, he was prosecuted under the much harsher 2011 version of SORA and ultimately convicted of failing to register.

Everything changed in 2021, when the Michigan Supreme Court decided People v. Betts. After examining the 2011 version of SORA in its entirety, the Betts court concluded that SORA was no longer merely a civil regulatory system. Instead, the law had become so punitive in its effects that applying it to people whose offenses occurred before the 2011 amendments violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto punishment. In other words, the state could not retroactively impose these new, harsher registration requirements on people whose crimes had been committed years earlier.

But one major question remained unanswered: What about people whose failure to register or disclose information convictions had already become final before Betts was decided?

That was the question presented in Shaver.

The Michigan Supreme Court held that Betts announced a new substantive constitutional rule, not merely a procedural one. Because substantive constitutional rules apply retroactively, people who had already been convicted under the unconstitutional 2011 SORA may seek relief through post-conviction proceedings.

The distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” may sound like legal jargon, but it carries enormous consequences. Procedural rules generally affect how courts conduct trials. Substantive rules, by contrast, limit the government’s power to punish certain conduct or certain people. The Michigan Supreme Court explained that Betts falls into the second category because it removes the state’s authority to punish pre-2011 registrants under the unconstitutional 2011 version of SORA.

The decision is significant for reasons beyond Michigan. Across the country, legislatures have repeatedly expanded registration laws years after people completed their criminal sentences. Courts have often struggled with the question of when those changes become punishment rather than regulation. Shaver reinforces an important constitutional principle: when a law crosses the line into punishment, the government cannot retroactively impose it on people whose offenses occurred before the law existed. Just as importantly, the decision recognizes that constitutional rights are meaningful only if they can be enforced by people whose convictions are already final.

For registrants and advocates, Shaver is a reminder that major constitutional victories do not end with the first favorable decision. Sometimes a second case is needed to ensure those victories reach the people they were meant to protect. In Michigan, Shaver does exactly that, opening the door for individuals convicted under the unconstitutional 2011 SORA to seek the relief that Betts promised.

The post  People v. Shaver — A Victory for Those Convicted Under Michigan’s Unconstitutional Registry Law first appeared on NARSOL.

By Philip

Charleston, WV – June 17, 2026 – The National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws (NARSOL) has filed a second federal

lawsuit in the Southern District of West Virginia challenging the state law that imposes a $125 annual fee on individuals required to register as sex offenders.

The lawsuit, Basham et al. v. Mitchell, filed on behalf of West Virginia’s 6,450 registrants, argues that the fee, which became effective on January 1, 2026, constitutes an unconstitutional punitive fine rather than a legitimate administrative cost.

The Challenge

Under W. Va. Code Ann. § 15-12-2(o), registrants must pay $125 annually or face property liens, regardless of their ability to pay. The state expects the fee to generate over $800,000 per year.

Where the Money Goes

According to the complaint, none of the collected fees are earmarked for sex offender registration functions. Instead, the funds will:

• first support mental health counselors, seminars, and training for current and former West Virginia state police employees—whether or not they work with the registry;
• then fund any other expenses “essential to the general operations of the State Police.”

The complaint emphasizes that no fees will be used for “sex offender notification, registration, verification, or compliance.”

Constitutional Claims

The complaint, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raises an Ex Post Facto constitutional claim.

Ex Post Facto Clause (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 10)

• Unlike the earlier Kaso v. Mitchell case, this lawsuit does not assert claims under the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, it focuses exclusively on the Ex Post Facto Clause.
• Plaintiffs argue that the annual fee constitutes a retroactive punishment because it was enacted in 2025 and later amended in 2026, long after their convictions and sentences became final.
• The complaint contends that the fee is not a genuine regulatory fee but rather a punitive fine because:
  • It is imposed solely because of a past criminal conviction;
  • It can be imposed annually, often for life;
  • Nonpayment triggers a judgment lien against the registrant’s property;
  • Revenue is used for state police mental health programs and general operations rather than registry administration.
• Plaintiffs further argue that the statute fails the punitive-effects analysis described in Smith v. Doe and Mendoza-Martinez, asserting that it resembles punishment in purpose and effect.

About NARSOL & WVRSOL

The National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws is a civil rights organization dedicated to promoting evidence-based policies and constitutional protections for individuals affected by sex offense laws.

West Virginians for Rational Sexual Offense Laws is NARSOL’s West Virginia state affiliate that advocates for registered citizens in West Virginia. We are working to make the 2020s ​a decade known for criminal justice reform, rational sexual offense laws, and restorative justice.

The post NARSOL & WVRSOL File Second Federal Lawsuit Challenging West Virginia’s $125 Annual Registry Fee first appeared on NARSOL.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Contact:
communications@narsol.org

Austin, TX – February 26, 2026 – The National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws (NARSOL) has filed a federal civil rights lawsuit in the Western District of Texas challenging the current deregistration process in the state that arbitrarily bars those convicted in federal court from deregistration.

The proposed class action lawsuit Burton, et al. v Martin et al., submitted on behalf of the plaintiff and all similarly situated plaintiffs in Texas, contends that the state has arbitrarily denied individuals convicted in federal court access to the same deregistration process provided by law to state-convicted registrants with substantially similar offenses.  NARSOL’s staff attorney and Texas-based attorney Courtney Vincent jointly filed the action.

Under the state interpretation of current Article 62.404 law, only those convicted of a sexual offense in Texas state court can deregister. Those convicted in federal court cannot.

According to the complaint, the state has violated constitutional provisions of the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process. In addition, the statute in question places a venue bar for the deregistration process by requiring registrants to file the deregistration action “. . . with the trial court that sentenced the person.” While those convicted in state court can do this, those with federal convictions cannot. Citing the venue restriction, the state has denied all federally convicted registrants from the deregistration process. The lawsuit argues that a restriction on venue should not be construed as a jurisdictional limitation for deregistration in state court.

The class action suit, represented by the plaintiff and NARSOL, is partially funded by Texas Voices for Reason and Justice, NARSOL’s Texas state affiliate. The complaint requests that the Court:

• Permanently enjoin Defendants from treating Article 62.404’s filing directive as a jurisdictional bar to motions filed by federally convicted registrants;
• Declare that, to the extent Defendants continue to interpret or enforce Article 62.404 as categorically barring federally convicted registrants from accessing any judicial forum, such interpretation and enforcement violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
• Declare that Defendants’ interpretation and enforcement of Article 62.404 violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating a statutory remedy that is illusory and denying federally convicted registrants any meaningful opportunity to be heard;

The National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws (NARSOL) is a civil rights organization dedicated to promoting evidence-based policies and constitutional protections for individuals affected by sex offense laws.

They will provide updates as the case progresses.

Note to editors: Court documents and supporting materials available upon request.

The post NARSOL Files Federal Lawsuit Challenging Texas Deregistration for Federal Convictions first appeared on NARSOL.

On January 27, 2026, NARSOL, in collaboration with AZRSOL, filed a federal lawsuit in Arizona challenging the constitutionality of the Internet restrictions imposed by the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department on individuals convicted of sex offenses. Titled Kenneth Soule et al. v. Michael Cimino, in his official capacity as Chief Probation Officer of the Maricopa County Adult Probation

Department, Case No. 26-cv-00560, the case has four named Plaintiffs, all of whom are under the custody of Maricopa County Adult Probation Department and seek greater Internet access while on probation. Plaintiffs seek to have the case certified as a class action.

Plaintiffs claim that the current policy and practices of the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department unreasonably restrict Plaintiffs’ access to the Internet in violation the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that the Department’s policies violate the First Amendment because the restrictions imposed are “overly broad” in that they “impose categorical restrictions on Internet access for individuals on probation for sex offenses, regardless of offense conduct, supervision progress, or individualized risk assessment.” Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ¶ 71. Plaintiffs allege the Department’s policies violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the Department imposed its Internet restrictions “without individualized findings, written justifications, or any standardized review mechanism.” Id. at ¶ 81.

NARSOL-affiliated attorneys Mark Weinberg and Adele Nicholas have brought the case, along with local Arizona counsel Samantha K. DuMond of the Dumond Law Firm in Phoenix Arizona.

The post NARSOL files constitutional case in Arizona first appeared on NARSOL.

By John . . . NARSOL’s Pennsylvania affiliate, the Pennsylvania Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws (PARSOL), celebrates a major legal victory for workers with criminal records following yesterday’s decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Phath v. Central Transport LLC. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and held that Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA) protects job applicants even when an employer learns about a past conviction directly from the applicant rather than from a state criminal-records file.

In PARSOL’s sign-on as an amicus to the court filing, PARSOL Managing Director John Dawe wrote, “We are deeply invested in ensuring that individuals with criminal records are afforded fair opportunities for employment and reintegration into society, and our interests align with Pennsylvania’s long-standing policy to avoid

unwarranted stigmatization and unreasonable restrictions on those with conviction histories.”

In its opinion, the Third Circuit emphasized that “. . . job hunting is never easy; having a criminal conviction makes it much harder,” and confirmed that CHRIA “. . . limits when and how employers may use an applicant’s criminal history.” The panel concluded that Central Transport could not avoid CHRIA’s requirements simply because it received information about Rodney Phath’s fifteen‑year‑old robbery conviction from him during the hiring process rather than through a background check.

This outcome directly aligns with the position advanced in an amicus brief joined by PARSOL and more than fifteen other nonprofit organizations, led by the National Employment Law Project (NELP) and litigated by Outten & Golden LLP. The amici urged the court to reject a narrow reading of CHRIA that would have allowed employers to sidestep the law’s protections simply by asking applicants to self‑disclose their records instead of obtaining them from a state agency.

“PARSOL was proud to stand with NELP and our many partners in this case to defend Pennsylvanians’ right to fair consideration for employment,” said Dawe. “The court squarely rejected an attempt to create a massive loophole in CHRIA and affirmed that employers cannot sidestep the law simply by asking applicants to disclose their own criminal histories. We continue to champion fully-inclusive ban‑the‑box and fair‑chance hiring laws in the Commonwealth that would further reduce stigmatization and help ensure candidates are evaluated on their qualifications, not solely on past convictions.”

The amicus brief detailed how millions of Pennsylvanians live with criminal records and face steep barriers to work that are often unrelated to their ability to safely and successfully perform a job. It also highlighted Pennsylvania’s long‑standing public policy, rooted in state constitutional principles, that disfavors blanket employment exclusions based on prior convictions and instead requires that any consideration of a conviction be tied to the actual duties of the job. CHRIA codifies that policy by allowing employers to consider felony and misdemeanor convictions only to the extent they relate to an applicant’s suitability for the specific position and by requiring written notice when criminal history is used to deny employment.

In Phath, after Mr. Phath disclosed a fifteen‑year‑old armed‑robbery conviction, Central Transport rejected him for a truck‑driving job  despite his commercial driver’s license, relevant experience, and federal port clearance. The Third Circuit’s decision means his CHRIA claim may now proceed, and it sends a strong signal to employers across Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit that they must comply with CHRIA’s substantive and notice requirements whenever they rely on an applicant’s criminal history, regardless of how that information is obtained.

“This decision is a critical affirmation that CHRIA has real teeth,” PARSOL’s spokesperson added. “For people with records—including those with sexual‑offense histories who are committed to living offense‑free and contributing to their communities—access to fair employment screening is essential for public safety, family stability, and successful reintegration.”

PARSOL extends its gratitude to the National Employment Law Project, which led the amicus project; to co‑counsel at Outten & Golden LLP; and to all of the organizations that joined the brief, whose collective expertise and advocacy helped underscore the importance of CHRIA to workers, families, and communities throughout Pennsylvania.

The post PARSOL Applauds Third Circuit Victory Protecting Fair Chance Hiring in Pennsylvania first appeared on NARSOL.

By Sandy and John . . . Portez Smith arrived outside Jesse Grover’s duplex early on Sunday, November 17, 2024, yelling through the closed door, “Grover, you’re a f—ing pedophile,” and when Grover opened the door, Smith pulled out a gun and shot him to death. Jesse Grover was registered on Pennsylvania’s sex offender registry as a Tier I offender. This holiday season, Grover leaves behind his wife, parents, four siblings, four stepchildren, and numerous other family members. He is remembered for his sweet smile and gentleness and as a beloved family member, a good friend, and a lover of reading, cooking, and music.

Grover’s murder is not the first registrant to face such a fate. Gary Blanton was a young married father of two infant sons living in Washington State when, in 2012, Patrick Drum shot him to death for being on the Washington registry for a consensual sexual act with another minor from twelve years prior. Drum then went to the home of registrant Jerry Ray and killed him. With the Washington sex offender registry in hand, he was on the way to shoot a third registrant in another county when apprehended (https://archive.is/T5Zc5).

Charles and Gretchen Parker were at their South Carolina home when Jeremy and Christine Moody stopped in front of their house and raised the hood of their car. Charles was a mechanic and went outside to help. The Moodys entered their home and slaughtered both Charles, a South Carolina registrant, and his wife Gretchen, with a gun and knife. Like Drum, they already had targeted their next victim, another person on the sex offender registry, when they were apprehended. In the wake of these murders, the National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws asked then-governor Nikki Haley to have the home addresses of registrants removed from the public view of the online registry; the request was disregarded.

Portez Smith’s rant at Jesse Grover reveals almost as much about his beliefs as his senseless act of violence does. It is commonly believed that everyone on a registry has a sexual offense against a child: This is a fallacy. In every state, virtually every crime that can have a sexual component carries with it an obligation to register. In many states, non-sexual crimes require registration. And in some states, many of those required to register are minors. Blanton was the same age as his teenage girlfriend when he was convicted for consensual sex with her; her parents pushed for an arrest when they learned of the relationship. Statistics suggest that a third of the offenders against minors are themselves minors. Children have been put on a registry as young as eight.

The most disturbing factor about these murders is that a segment of the community views these vigilantes as heroes. Social media and online articles about these incidents further this perception by allowing ten or even twenty comments praising the vigilante for each one condemning the act of violence. Recently, the glorification of “predator catchers” has driven groups of gangs and teenagers to show up at registrants’ homes to “carry out justice.”  Numerous studies document various degrees of violence and harassment registrants and their family members face daily. 

Blanton’s wife publicly asked that Drum’s supporters stop the harassment of her and her children. According to CBS News, the judge at Drum’s hearing admonished those who were in the courtroom in support of Drum to cease their activity. Leslie said she and her family had been spat upon, had things thrown at their car, had their house targeted, and more.

So what is the answer? The first, quickest, and most straightforward answer is a “band-aid” measure that NARSOL asked South Carolina to take: remove the home and business addresses from public view. This will at least require vigilantes to work a little harder to achieve their goals. Supporters of the registry argue that knowing where registrants live protects their communities, but the USDOJ reports that more than 93% of the cases of sexual harm are committed by someone known to the victim, and 95% are not registrants. Additionally research shows that sex crimes have the lowest recidivism rates of any crime class tracked except murder.

The long-term fix is not an easy one. It involves changing hearts and minds toward a willingness to put aside emotional responses and adopt rational and logical facts. Several decades of evidence-based data show us the sex offender registry is ineffective at every level. It does not make communities safer, protect children from sexual abuse, help those who have caused harm, nor heal those who have been harmed. Instead, it puts families of registrants in harm’s way, impedes rehabilitation, destroys the opportunity to rebuild damaged lives, and costs taxpayers an enormous and ever-burgeoning amount of resources.

One bright spot on the horizon is the increasing prevalence of restorative justice programs. These alternatives to harsh punishment for offenders and nothing for those offended bring the two sides together—for those who choose it—to dialogue, understand each other better, express remorse and forgiveness, and pave the road for future reconciliation. Because the majority of sexual harm happens within families, this is an excellent choice. 

Policymakers need to abolish the secondary punishments accompanying registration. Special restrictions such as residence, proximity, and Halloween restrictions are statistically useless in furthering public safety and child protection. Abolishing them would save significant public funds that could be better used for evidence-based prevention measures.

Most legislators claim to be fiscally responsible, data-informed, and against unfunded mandates. Yet they seem to forget those words when it comes to tightening the plethora of laws and restrictions (such as residence, proximity, and Halloween restrictions) that affect persons required to register. Politicians wanting to project a “tough on crime” platform turn to sex crimes because society’s taboo on anything sexual combined with the visceral nature of sex crimes causes electors and officials to abandon rationality for emotionalism. 

Meaningful reform will begin when enough citizens protest the waste of human lives and public monies and when decision-makers at all levels adopt evidence-based solutions to preventing sexual harm and rehabilitating those with past sexual offenses.

* A version of this article also appeared in the December 20, 2024 issue of Merion West.

The post Vigilantism & Death: A Harsh Reality for Citizens on the ‘Sex Offender’ Registry first appeared on NARSOL.

Stephen . . . NARSOL recently assisted two Texas registrants who reported that they were being improperly required to remain on the state’s sex‑offense registry despite having successfully completed deferred adjudication—a legal process in which a court

withdraws a permanent conviction upon the individual’s completion of probation without further incident. After review by NARSOL’s Legal Committee, the organization retained seasoned Texas attorney Scott Smith to present the matter to the Department of Public Safety. DPS agreed with the legal analysis and administratively removed both individuals from the registry. Following that determination, an additional six registrants were subsequently removed, with more cases currently under review. 

Individuals may qualify for removal if they entered deferred adjudication prior to September 1, 1999, and successfully completed the probationary period. NARSOL anticipates that additional Texas registrants may be eligible under the same legal framework. Those seeking guidance on the proper procedure for review and potential removal are encouraged to contact NARSOL’s Texas affiliate, Texas Voices for Reason and Justice, for detailed assistance at  info@texasvoices.org. 

The post NARSOL Secures Registry Removals for Texans Wrongly Listed After Deferred Adjudication  first appeared on NARSOL.